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Abstract
Secure compilation aims to build compilation chains that
preserve security properties when translating programs from
a source to a target language. Recent research led to the def-
inition of secure compilation principles that, if met, guaran-
tee that the compilation chain in hand never violates spe-
cific families of security properties. Still, to the best of our
knowledge, no effective procedure is available to check if a
compilation chain meets such requirements. Here, we out-
line our ongoing research inspired by translation validation,
to effectively check one of those principles.
1 Introduction
Secure compilation is concerned with ensuring that the secu-
rity properties at the source level are preserved as they are
at the target level or, equivalently, that all the attacks that
can be carried out at the target level are also possible at the
source level. In this way, it is enough to reason at the source
level to rule out attacks at all.
Consider a functional and reactive source language with
I/O primitives, but none for communication, and a compiler
to a target language that relies on system calls for manag-
ing the I/O (on screen, network, etc.). A run of the compiler
transforms the source program
S , λi.if i ≥ 0 then (print i; i) else (−1)
into the target program
T , λi.if i ≥ 0 then (sc_print i; i) else (−1)
(we highlight in blue the elements of the source language,
and in red the elements of the target language for better
readability). Although correct, this compilation does not pre-
serve the security property requiring a program to never
send a value on the network, which S enjoys in any context
– an expression with a single hole. This property still holds
when T is plugged into a non-evil target context that cor-
rectly implements the system calls. Instead things go wrong
when the context is evil, i.e. it maliciously implements the
system calls. For example, the property is violated when we
plug T into
CevilT ,
(
λi.let sc_print=λx.(display x; send x) in [·] i
)
42.
Our idea is to provide a method, inspired by translation
validation (TV) [8], that we call secure translation validation
(STV). It automatically decides if a compiler preserves a fam-
ily of hyperproperties of interest, for a given program P.
STV is carried on at load time and we argue that this is the
right time. On the one hand, it is not too early because one
typically wants some security guarantees on a module, e.g.
a library, before launching a program using it. On the other
hand, it is not too late, since executing the same program in
different contexts results in different security guarantees.
2 Our proposal
The technique TV checks the correctness of the compilation
of a given program P, rather than proving the compiler cor-
rect for all inputs. Roughly, it works as follows: first, the
source and the target languages are endowed with seman-
tics sharing the same observables; then a suitable simula-
tion is defined between the result of the compilation and
the corresponding source program: if such a simulation ex-
ists, the compiler is correct; finally, an algorithm effectively
computes the required simulation, if any. Remarkably, this
algorithm gives a fully automatic way of checking the cor-
rectness of real compilers [6]. A tempting approach could
be mechanically proving also the security of a compiler by
showing (the existence of) a (suitable) simulation between
the source and the target program. However, the construc-
tion of the required simulation, if any, is undecidable when
the program in hand is not finite-state [5]. Static analysis
comes to our rescue and allows us to devise a mechanical
(and approximated) procedure to deal with this problem.
More precisely, we proceed as follows. At load time we
plug the compiled program nPo into the (target) context,
obtaining C
T
[nPo], the behaviour of which is safely over-
approximated by a static analysis. An approximation is a
history expression [3], i.e. a (finite-state) process of a basic
process algebra [4], whose actions are the observables of
the trace semantics of the target and source languages. For
example, in the code above the observable of the primitive
print will be display.
Once the history expression for C
T
[nPo] is computed, we
verify on it if the compilation process broke some of the
properties of interest. The actual verification depends on the
family of properties we are interested in. A first principle
that one might consider is full abstraction (FA) [1]:
∀P1, P2 . P1 ≃ P2 ⇔ nP1o ≃ nP2o
1
where P1 and P2 are programs, while ≃ and ≃ are suitable
notions of behavioural equivalence. However, FA has well-
known shortcomings [7] and does not fit well with STV be-
cause of the universal quantification over pairs of programs.
Actually, the principles proposed by Abate et al. [2] are
more appropriate for STV purposes, in particular robustly
safe compilation (RSC):
∀P,CT,m.
(
m ∈ Pref (CT[nPo]) ⇒ ∃CS.m ∈ Pref (CS[P])
)
.
Intuitively, RSC considers finite traces produced by the com-
piled program when plugged in a possibly evil context: the
compiler preserves all the safety properties iff there exists
a context in which the source program also produces the
same finite trace. The operator Pref (·) returns the set of the
prefixes of the traces of its argument.
We can effectively check this principle by using STV. In-
deed, we can get rid of the universal quantifiers on programs
and contexts because STV only considers a single program
at a time and is performed at load time. Given a program P
and a context C
T
, it suffices then verifying the following
STV RSC , m ∈ Pref (HT) ⇒ ∃CS.m ∈ Pref (HS)
whereHT is the history expression associated with CT[nPo]
and HS that associated with CS[P].
Since history expressions safely approximate the behaviour
of programs, their semantics includes the set of traces of the
program they are associated with. Also, since the proper-
ties of interest are defined in terms of traces, STV succeeds
when a CS with the desired property can be proved to exist
starting from HT. Note that, since history expressions are
processes of a basic process algebra, it is decidable whether
a prefix belongs to the semantics of a history expression.
However, there is a price to pay in order to have an effec-
tive procedure. False negatives may be produced, and we
may fail to prove a compilation secure because history ex-
pressions over-approximate the behaviour of programs.
To intuitively illustrate the idea, recall the example above
and assume to design our history expressions to track the
I/O actions of a program. Consider now the history expres-
sion associated with T plugged into the evil context Cevil
T
:
Hevil = (display · send) + ϵ
Intuitively it represents that C
T
[T]writes on the screen and
sends something on the network, or does nothing (ϵ). The
prefix display · send ofHT has no counterpart in any source
level context (recall that the source language cannot per-
form I/O on the network). So, this program and context com-
bination is rejected by our analysis.
Instead, plugging T into the following non-evil context:
C
friendly
T
, (λi.let sc_out=λx.display x in [·] i) 42
results in the history expression
Hfriendly = display + ϵ
that has an acceptable counterpart in the source contexts.
Our property thus holds and security is preserved.
Our approach works also for program optimizations. For
example, consider a source program S′ that has a choice
between two behaviour, both prefixed by an output on the
screen. e.g. a warning to the user. Its history expression will
essentially be as follows:
HS′ = ((display · H1) + (display · H2))
Anyoptimizing compilerwill detect that both branches share
the same output, and will factor it out of the choice. The his-
tory expression associated with the optimized program T′
will be
HT′ = display · (H1 + H2)
Plugging T′ into a non-evil target context results in C′T[T
′]
(with history expression HC′
T
[T′]). It is not difficult finding a
source level context C′S such that any prefix of C
′
T[T
′] has
a counterpart in C′S[S
′] (with history expression H′
C′S[S
′]
).
The task is easy, because HC′
T
[T′] and H
′
C′
S
[S′]
have the same
semantics — in this case equivalence is trivial, while in more
complex cases one can use the equational theory over his-
tory expressions, which is decidable [3].
We briefly discussed examples showing how safety prop-
erty preservation can be effectively checked. We are cur-
rently extending STV to deal with safety hyperproperties,
and we are confident that also other families of properties
can fit our proposal.
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